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Abstract
Federated recommendation systems can provide good performance without collect-
ing users’ private data, making them attractive. However, they are susceptible to
low-cost poisoning attacks that can degrade their performance. In this paper, we
develop a novel federated recommendation technique that is robust against the poi-
soning attack where Byzantine clients prevail. We argue that the key to Byzantine
detection is monitoring of gradients of the model parameters of clients. We then
propose a robust learning strategy where instead of using model parameters, the
central server computes and utilizes the gradients to filter out Byzantine clients.
Theoretically, we justify our robust learning strategy by our proposed definition of
Byzantine resilience. Empirically, we confirm the efficacy of our robust learning
strategy employing four datasets in a federated recommendation system.
1 Introduction
Recommendation systems (RS), which are machine learning models that try to predict the user
(client) preferences, are increasingly being deployed commercially [22; 4; 26; 37; 32; 35]. Learning
a conventional RS requires centralized storage of clients’ data, which raises privacy concerns [6]. In
order to make RS compliant with privacy regulation while preserving the quality of recommendation
service, federated recommendation system (FRS) has attracted recent attention [1; 10; 29]. An FRS
is able to learn a quality recommendation model without holding clients’ data centrally.
However, due to the decentralized data storage, FRS is susceptible to low-cost poisoning attacks [40;
7; 13; 23; 20; 36]. An unscrupulous competitor can easily create a small number of malicious clients,
i.e., Byzantine clients, to bias the recommendations [3; 2; 40; 36]. Consequently, a non-robust
federated recommendation system with irrelevant recommendations will soon lose its reputation and
trust. Therefore, developing a federated recommendation system that is robust against poisoning
attacks is necessary.
It appears that learning a robust FRS can directly employ existing defense strategies, i.e., utilize the
model parameters among clients to detect Byzantine clients [7; 11; 23; 41; 21]. The tacit assumption
of the existing defense strategies is that the clients optimize their local models with (stochastic)
gradient descent (SGD), where the update of the model parameter is identical to the gradient (of
the model parameter). However, in learning FRS, SGD often leads to poor performance due to the
problem of vanishing gradients, slow convergence, and its inability to handle sparse data [43; 42].
Consequently, it is common for clients to employ momentum-based optimizers such as Adam [19]
and SGD with momentum [30] to optimize their local models [1; 17; 9]. Our experimental findings
in Appendix H.2 also substantiate this. Naturally, the following question arises:
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Figure 1: Comparison between model parameters and gradients. 58 benign clients (blue dots) and 32
Byzantine clients (orange triangles) federally use Adam to jointly optimize a matrix factorization
model [1]. We extract model parameters (left panel) and gradients (right panel) from all 90 clients
at the 24-th training round and use principal components analysis (PCA) to project them into 2-D
dimension for visualization.
Can we simply employ the model parameters of clients to detect Byzantine clients
when momentum-based optimizers are used to learn the federated recommendation
system?
We argue that the answer to the above question is negative. We further propose that we should utilize
gradients rather than model parameters to detect Byzantine clients. For example, when a client uses
Adam to optimize its local model, the update to the model parameter is not identical to the gradient
of the local model [19]. Actually, the model parameter is adaptively updated based on the current
gradient and gradients in the previous rounds. If the client is Byzantine, its model gradient could
largely deviate from that of benign clients (e.g., Byzantine clients perform gradient ascent while
benign clients perform gradient descent [40]). However, the model parameter of the Byzantine client
could be similar to that of the benign client due to the fact that the model parameter accumulates
gradients (including other benign gradients) of the previous training rounds. As a result, Byzantine
model parameters are less distinguishable from benign ones compared to Byzantine gradients. To
illustrate this fact, in Figure 1, we trained a simple federated recommendation system with 58 benign
clients (blue dots) and 32 Byzantine clients (orange triangles) using Adam optimizer. We plotted
the clients’ model parameters (left panel) and the clients’ gradients (right panel) at a randomly
selected training round. From Figure 1, model parameters from Byzantine and benign clients are
less distinguishable than the gradients. This issue affects all momentum-based optimizers including
Adam, and we will elaborate in Section 4.
To learn a robust federated recommendation system, rather than using clients’ model parameters, we
propose to utilize gradients to detect Byzantine clients. Our main contributions are:
1. We first employ factored item similarity model (FISM) [18] in learning a federated recom-
mendation system (FRS), which achieves state-of-the-art performance. Our method is able
to handle real-time personalization and sparse client feedback [16] better than the existing
methods [1; 10; 29].
2. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a robust federated recommendation
system against the poisoning attack. We show that when clients use momentum-based
optimizers such as Adam, Byzantine clients are able to camouflage their model parameters
and launch effective attacks. However if we employ gradients for detection, it can effectively
thwart Byzantine clients. We propose a new definition of Byzantine resilience catering to
momentum-based optimized FRS, and we provide a theoretically guarantee that our robust
learning strategy (gradient-based detection) is Byzantine resilient. Empirically, we conduct
extensive experiments on real-world datasets verifying the efficacy of our robust learning
strategy against poisoning attacks. Besides momentum-based optimizers, we further show
that our robust learning strategy can be easily adapted to other well-known optimizers
such as AdaGrad [12] and RMSProp [31] and still preserves the theoretical guarantee of
Byzantine resilience.
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2 Background and notations
In this section, we review factored item similarity model (FISM) and Adam optimizer used in
federated recommendation system (FRS).
Notations. We use bold lower-case letters such as m to represent vectors, lower-case letters such
as m to represent scalars, and upper-case curlicue letters such as S to represent sets. Aggregated
vectors are denoted by a line over vectors such as m. Byzantine vectors are denoted by a tilde over
vectors such as m˜. ‖m‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of m. |S| is the cardinality of set S .  denotes
element-wise multiplication (Hadamard product). All operations between vectors are element-wise
operations in this paper (except inner products of vectors).
Factored item similarity model (FISM). In online services (e.g., YouTube, Amazon, etc.), clients
constantly update their preference data [5]. It is imperative for recommendation systems to handle
real-time personalization [14]. Moreover, many clients’ activities are not frequent, i.e., the client-item
rating matrix is sparse [25]. To deal with real-time personalization and sparse data, factored item
similarity model (FISM) was proposed [18]. FISM utilizes the average embedding vector of items
that have been rated by client i to represent client i’s feature and then uses the inner product of client
i’s and item j’s embedding vectors to calculate the prediction score of client i on item j. Formally,
the predictive model is:
yˆij =
(
pj
)>
︸ ︷︷ ︸
item j’s embedding vector
(
1
|Si+\{j}|γ
∑
k∈Si+\{j}
qk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
client i’s embedding vector
.
(1)
yˆij is the prediction score of client i on item j. Si+ is the set of client i’s rated items. γ is a
hyperparameter controlling the normalization effect. pj ,qk ∈ Rd are the trainable embedding
vectors for item j and k respectively. d is the dimension of the embedding vectors. Each item j
has two embedding vectors pj and qj : pj represents the item feature for prediction, while qj is a
historical interaction used for representing client feature. For clarity, we use θ to represent trainable
embedding vectors pj and qj for all items j.
When client i interacts with a new item j, we just need to add item j to Si+, i.e., Si+ = Si+ ∪ {j},
and do not need to retrain the model. On the other hand, even if a client has less activity, it can be
represented by an average embedding vector of items, which prevents overfitting of the model.
Adam optimizer. Adam optimizer has been widely used in learning FRS, due to its fast convergence
property and its ability to handle sparse gradients [1]. Different from SGD that directly uses gradients
to update model parameters, Adam updates the model parameters using estimates of first and second
moments of the gradients. At round t, client i uses Adam optimizer to update its model parameter θti
according to:
mti = β1m
t−1 + (1− β1)gti (2)
vti = β2v
t−1 + (1− β2)gti  gti (3)
ηt = η
√
1− βt2
1− βt1
(4)
uti =
mti√
vti + 
(5)
θti = θ
t−1 − ηtuti, (6)
where gti, mti, vti, uti and θti are gradient, first moment, second moment, update and model
parameter of the i-th client at t-th (communication) round. mt−1, vt−1 and θ
t−1
that are the inputs
at round t respectively represent aggregated first moment, aggregated second moment and aggregated
model parameter at (t − 1)-th round. β1 and β2 are hyperparameters related to first and second
moment vectors. η is the learning rate. m0, v0 are initialized to 0. θ
0
is initialized with random
values sampled from a standard Gaussian distribution.  is a small constant for numerical stability.
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Algorithm 1 Adam-based (Robust) Federated Recommendation System - A-(R)FRS
Input: Client set S, number of training rounds T , and fraction of training clients per round e
Output: Trained model parameter θT (Represents the trainable parameter of Eq. (1))
procedure SERVER AGGREGATION
Initialize m0, v0, and θ
0
for each round t = 1, 2, ..., T do
St ← random subset of S . |St| = e ∗ |S|.
for each client i ∈ St do in parallel
mti,vti,θti ← ClientUpdate(mt−1,vt−1,θt−1) . Algorithm 2.
gti ← Compute with mti and mt−1 . Use Eq. (2) for Byzantine clients detection.
end for
Option I: Ft ← St . Non-robust FRS. Ignore the computed gti.
Option II: Ft ← F (gt1, ...,gt|S
t|) . Robust FRS. Use the computed gti.
N t =
∑
i∈Ft n
i . ni is the number of training data of client i.
mt ←∑i∈Ft niNtmti
vt ←∑i∈Ft niNtvti
θ
t ←∑i∈Ft niNt θti
end for
end procedure
Algorithm 2 Client update using Adam optimizer
Input: Aggregated first moment mt−1, aggregated second moment vt−1 and aggregated model
parameter θ
t−1
at round (t− 1) from the server
Output: First moment mti, second moment vti and model parameter θti of client i at round t
procedure CLIENT UPDATE . Run on the i-th client.
gti ← ∇`(θt−1;Di) . Compute gradient by Eq. (7) using local dataset Di.
mti,vti,θti ← AdamUpdate(gti,mt−1,vt−1) . Apply Eq. (2-6).
end procedure
3 Federated recommendation system
In this section, we employ factored item similarity model (FISM) [18] in federated recommendation
system (FRS), namely, Adam-based federated recommendation system (A-FRS). Then, we introduce
the training process for A-FRS (Algorithm 1).
Conventional federated recommendation systems based on matrix factorization (MF) [1; 10; 29] fail
to deal with real-time personalization and sparse data [18; 27; 17]. To solve this problem, we propose
Adam-based federated recommendation system (A-FRS), which extends FISM to be a FRS. A-FRS
inherits the advantages of FISM [18]. It can handle real-time personalization and deal with sparse
data with the ability to learn a quality recommendation model without collecting clients’ data.
The learning of A-FRS is shown in Algorithm 1 (Option I). In Algorithm 1, A-FRS consists of
two parts: a server and |S| clients. The server distributes first moment, second moment, and model
parameters to the clients for training and aggregates those trained by all clients.
Clients optimize their local recommendation model based on the ranking loss [28] defined as follows:
` = −
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Si+
∑
k∈Si−
log σ(yˆij − yˆik) + λ ‖θ‖ , (7)
where S is the client set. σ(·) is the sigmoid function. θ denotes trainable model parameter. λ
controls the strength of L2 regularization to prevent overfitting. Si+ and Si− are sets of client i’s
rated items and unrated items respectively. yˆij and yˆik can be calculated with Eq. (1). Similar to
other federated recommendation methods [1], clients utilize Adam to optimize model parameters.
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Figure 2: Left panel shows the relation between the model parameter θti and the gradient gti of client
i at round t according to Eq. (2-6). Right panel shows the Byzantine clients can launch the effective
poisoning attack while keep model parameters the same as those of benign ones.
Compared with SGD, two additional terms (the first moment m and the second moment v) are
introduced in Adam. Thus, clients also need to transfer these two terms to the server for aggregation.
4 Robust federated recommendation system
In this section, we first show that Byzantine clients can camouflage the model parameters and launch
effective attacks. Then, we propose our robust learning strategy in Adam-based FRS and theoretically
prove that our strategy is Byzantine resilient. Besides, in Appendix C, D, and E, we show that our
robust learning strategy is also suitable in FRS based on other well-known optimizers (e.g., SGD
with momentum, AdaGrad, and RMSProp) with theoretical guarantees.
4.1 Motivation - Byzantine clients can camouflage model parameters
We demonstrate that when clients use momentum-based optimizers such as Adam, the Byzantine
clients can camouflage their model parameters while launching an effective poisoning attack2. Thus,
the existing defense methods [7; 11; 23] catering to SGD optimizer can not be simply applied, because
they detect Byzantine clients based on the model parameters.
In the left panel of Figure 2, the i-th client at the round t uses Adam to optimize the local model. We
plot the parameter θti-gradient gti relationship. For simplicity, let θti and gti be scalars. Suppose
point A is the benign point with benign θti and gti, the Byzantine client can choose Byzantine point
B which has the same θti but completely different g˜ti that is calculated by
g˜ti =
2β1β2 (1− β1)mt−1vt−1 + β2 (1− β1)2 vt−1gti − β21 (1− β2) (mt−1)2gti
β21 (1− β2) (mt−1)2 + 2β1 (1− β1) (1− β2)mt−1gti − β2 (1− β1)2 vt−1
. (8)
The detailed derivation is provided in Appendix F. Eq. (8) is the case for one dimension. It can
be easily generalized into higher-dimensional model parameters due to element-wise operations of
Eq. (2-6). In particular, when the dimension of the model parameter θti is large, the number of such
Byzantine gradients g˜ti is exponential, because the Byzantine client can craft each component of
the Byzantine gradients g˜ti. Thus, the Byzantine client can easily choose a g˜ti that can effectively
poison the global model.
In the right panel of Figure 2, we conduct an experiment showing the efficacy of the camouflage
attack (red line). The blue line represents Precision@K [38] of A-FRS (Option I in Algorithm 1)
without any attack. The red line represents the Precision@K with 40% Byzantine clients. The
Byzantine clients maintain the same model parameters for update but calculate the Byzantine g˜ti that
has the largest Euclidean distance from the benign correspondence gti. Consequently, from the right
panel of Figure 2, the red line is lower than the blue line. It shows that the camouflage attack can
effectively degrade the global model.
It is worth noting that not all model parameters can be camouflaged. For example, in the left panel
of Figure 2, point C has a unique mapping from θti to gti. Thus, the Byzantine client has a certain
chance of failing to camouflage the model parameter. However, this chance is afflicted with the curse
2Byzantine clients will obey the Adam update rules (Eq. (2-6)). Otherwise, the server can easily detect the
abnormal behavior by verifying the Adam update rules.
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of dimensionality. As the dimensionality of model parameters is typically very large, the Byzantine
client can confidently camouflage the model parameter and launch effective attacks.
Motivated by the above observations, rather than using model parameters, we propose to use gradients
of the models to detect Byzantine clients in the following sections.
4.2 Byzantine resilience
The current defense methods employ the existing definitions of Byzantine resilience [7; 23; 39].
However, these definitions only provide restrictions to the model parameters of clients. For example,
if a client’s model parameter is very distinct from those of others, this client is deemed to be Byzantine.
These restrictions do not apply to first moment and second moment in Algorithm 2. As a result,
Byzantine clients can camouflage the model parameters but change the gradient along with first and
second moments to be very different (shown in Section 4.1). Thus, existing definitions have this
serious limitation, which can lead to a security breach.
To solve this, we give a new definition, Adam-Byzantine resilience to evaluate defense methods when
Adam is used in FRS. Other types of Byzantine resilience definitions catering to other optimizers
such as SGD with momentum, AdaGrad, and RMSProp can be found in Appendix C, D, and E.
Suppose n˜ out of n clients are Byzantine. Let Gt = {gti|i ∈ {1, ..., n− n˜}} be the gradient set of
n − n˜ benign clients at round t. Let G˜t = {g˜ti|i ∈ {1, ..., n˜}} be the gradient set of n˜ Byzantine
clients at round t. Let Ft be the set of selected clients for aggregation. Let Gˆt = {gˆti|client i ∈ Ft}
be the gradient set of clients in Ft. We define Adam-Byzantine resilience as follows:
Definition 1 Adam-Byzantine Resilience. For any client i in Ft at training round t, we denote its
first moment, second moment and model parameter as mˆti, vˆti and θˆ
ti
. For any benign client j at
training round t, we denote its first moment, second moment, and model parameter as mtj , vtj and
θtj . A defense method is Adam-Byzantine resilient, if for the round T there exist positive constant
numbers Cm, Cv and Cθ, such that
1.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ ≤ Cm;
2.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥ ≤ Cv;
3.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ.
The definition of Adam-Byzantine resilience provides constraints on first moments, second moments,
and model parameters. If a defense method is Adam-Byzantine resilient, no matter how Byzantine
clients attack the server (e.g., by using gradient ascent [7] or by adding random noise [21]), the attack
will have little influence on the global model, which guarantees the efficacy of the defense method.
In comparison, the existing definitions of Byzantine resilience [7; 11; 23] can provide no guarantees
on condition 1 and condition 2.
4.3 Adam-based robust federated recommendation system (A-RFRS)
When clients federally learn a recommendation system using Adam optimizer, we propose Adam-
based robust federated recommendation system (A-RFRS) (Option II in Algorithm 1). In A-RFRS,
gti are used to detect Byzantine clients, since mti, vti, and θti are computed by gti of client i
at round t. Compared with non-robust A-FRS (Option I), our robust version A-RFRS performs
a filtering operation before the aggregation of updates from clients. The filtering function F (·) is
flexible. In our paper, we utilize the strategy of Krum [7] to filter out Byzantine clients based on the
computed gradients.
To theoretically justify our proposed A-RFRS, we prove that A-RFRS is Adam-Byzantine resilient.
Assumption 1. For any gradient g, its norm is upper bounded by a positive constant number gmax.
Formally, ‖g‖ ≤ gmax with g ∈ Gt ∪ G˜t, t ∈ N∗.
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Figure 3: Precision@K of FRSs on 4 datasets. A-FRS (red line) is our proposed federated recom-
mendation method.
Assumption 2. After T ′ rounds of training, each component of vt−1 is lower bounded by a positive
constant number vmin. Formally, for any round t with t > T ′, vt−1k ≥ vmin, where vt−1k denotes the
k-th component of vt−1.
Theorem 1. A-RFRS is Adam-Byzantine resilient, if Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, and for
any client i in Ft with gradient gˆti ∈ Gˆt, for any benign client j with gradient gtj ∈ Gt, and for
training round T ∈ N∗, there exist a positive constant number Cg , such that
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B. Theorem 1 claims that, if our gradient-based filter algorithm
(e.g., gradient-based Krum) guarantees that gˆti is close to any benign gradient gtj , then the first
moment mˆti, second moment vˆti and model parameter θˆ
ti
will also be close to the benign mtj , vtj
and θtj . This indicates that our defense method is robust to Byzantine attacks. This further shows
that our learning strategy, which utilizes gradients to filter out Byzantine clients, is effective when
Adam optimizer is used.
We also show that our proposed robust learning strategy that utilizes gradients to detect Byzantine
clients, can be adapted to other well-known optimizers such as SGD with momentum, AdaGrad,
and RMSProp with theoretical guarantees. Those results and the proofs are in Appendix C, D, and
E, respectively. We also conduct experiments comparing our robust learning strategy with existing
defense methods on FRS based on SGD with momentum and AdaGrad in Appendix H.3.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed A-FRS (Option I in Algorithm 1) and
A-RFRS (Option II in Algorithm 1) on 4 real-world datasets from various domains (i.e., Last.fm [8],
ML100K [15], Citeulike-a [33], and Citeulike-t [34]).
Our experiments consist of two parts: firstly, we show the efficacy of our A-FRS; secondly, we
demonstrate A-RFRS can outperform other defense methods when clients use Adam optimizer to
optimize recommendation models. The evaluation metric are Precision@K [38] and Recall@K [22]
with the ranking position K ranges from 1 to 5. The detailed description of datasets and training
configurations are in Appendix G.
Federated recommendation system. In the first part of our experiments, we compare our A-FRS
(Option I in Algorithm 1) with existing federated matrix factorization (FMF) [1], which employs
matrix factorization in FRS. For each client, we randomly select 80% of its local data as the training
set and evaluate the global model with the remaining 20%.
Figure 3 shows Precision@K of FRSs on different datasets where the ranking position K ranges
from 1 to 5. We also report Recall@K [22] in Appendix H.1. The results demonstrate that our
proposed A-FRS (red line) outperforms FMF (blue line) on all datasets. Recommendation datasets
are often sparse, and our A-FRS employs factored item similarity model that is capable of dealing
with sparse data.
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Figure 4: Precision@K (mean and standard deviation) of all methods on 4 datasets and 3 different
numbers of Byzantine clients. A-RFRS (red line) is our proposed defense method.
Robust federated recommendation system. In the second part of our experiments, we demon-
strate the efficacy of our A-RFRS (Option II in Algorithm 1) under poisoning attacks when clients
use Adam optimizer. We compare A-RFRS with three defense baselines: Krum [7], RFA [24], and
Trmean [41]. The detailed descriptions of these baselines are in Appendix G.
In our setting, the Byzantine clients employ the gradient ascent attack [7]. The Byzantine clients
firstly use their own data to compute the gradient g normally, but use −g to calculate m˜, v˜ and θ˜ and
send them back to the server. We have also tried additive noise attack [21], where Byzantine clients
add Gaussian noise to their model parameters, but the additive noise attack has minor poisoning
effects on the global model. Thus, we do not consider the additive noise attack. In addition, we
also do not consider the camouflage attack (detailed in Section 4.1) in this section since the existing
defense methods only examine the model parameters, therefore they cannot defend camouflage attack
at all.
In Figure 4, we set the number of Byzantine clients n˜ = 0.2n, 0.3n, 0.4n, and evaluate and compare
our A-RFRS with RFA, Trmean, Krum and No defense model (our non-robust A-FRS) on four
different datasets. For each client, we randomly select 80% of the local data as the training set, but
we evaluate the global model with the remaining 20% data of benign clients. We run our experiment
with five repeated trials and report the average Precision@K (the ranking position K ranges from 1
to 5) and its standard deviation. We also report the average Recall@K and its standard deviation in
Appendix H.1.
Figure 4 demonstrates that our proposed A-RFRS (red line) outperforms all other defense baselines
on the four datasets with different portions of Byzantine clients. For example, on Last.fm dataset with
40% Byzantine clients, A-RFRS improves the best results of baselines by 33.7% on Precision@1.
This shows that our proposed A-RFRS achieves superior performance. In addition, our A-RFRS
outperforms Krum on all four datasets where the original Krum [7] detects Byzantine clients using
model parameters. This shows that gradients are more suitable than model parameters for detecting
Byzantine clients. To conclude, besides the theoretical guarantee in Section 4.3, we empirically show
the efficacy of our robust learning strategy against poisoning attacks.
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6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel robust learning strategy to defend poisoning attacks in momentum-based
federated recommendation system. We first show that Byzantine clients can camouflage the model
parameters and elude existing defense methods by launching an effective camouflage attack. To solve
this problem, we propose to use gradients (instead of model parameters) to filter out Byzantine clients
in momentum-based federated recommendation system. We theoretically proved that our proposed
robust learning strategy is Byzantine resilient and empirically verified its efficacy. A promising future
direction is extending the current work to defend targeted poisoning attacks.
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A Notations
Table 1: Notation table.
Notation Description
n Total number of clients
n˜ Total number of Byzantine clients
Ft Set of selected clients for aggregation at round t
mt−1 Aggregated first moment at round t− 1
vt−1 Aggregated second moment at round t− 1
rt−1 Aggregated squared gradient at round t− 1
θ
t−1
Aggregated model parameter at round t− 1
gˆti Gradient of i-th client in Ft
mˆti First moment of i-th client in Ft
vˆti Second moment of i-th client in Ft
rˆti Squared gradient of a client in Ft
θˆ
ti
Model parameter of i-th client in Ft
gti Gradient of i-th benign client at round t
mti First moment of i-th benign client at round t
vti Second moment of i-th benign client at round t
rti Squared gradient of i-th benign client at round t
θti Model parameter of i-th benign client at round t
g˜ti Gradient of i-th Byzantine client at round t
m˜ti First moment of i-th Byzantine client at round t
v˜ti Second moment of i-th Byzantine client at round t
r˜ti Squared gradient of i-th benign Byzantine at round t
θ˜
ti
Model parameter of i-th benign Byzantine at round t
β1 Hyperparameter of Adam, 0 < β1 < 1
β2 Hyperparameter of Adam, 0 < β2 < 1
β3 Hyperparameter of SGD with momentum, 0 < β3 < 1
β4 Hyperparameter of RMSProp, 0 < β4 < 1
 Element-wise multiplication
B Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we show the proof of Theorem 1.
Suppose n˜ out of n clients are Byzantine. Let Gt = {gti|i ∈ {1, ..., n− n˜}} be the gradient set of
n − n˜ benign clients at round t. Let G˜t = {g˜ti|i ∈ {1, ..., n˜}} be the gradient set of n˜ Byzantine
clients at round t. Let Ft be the set of selected clients for aggregation. Let Gˆt = {gˆti|client i ∈ Ft}
be the gradient set of clients in Ft. We define Adam-Byzantine resilience as follows:
Definition 1 Adam-Byzantine Resilience. For client i in Ft at training round t, we denote its first
moment, second moment and model parameter as mˆti, vˆti and θˆ
ti
. For any benign client j at training
round t, we denote its first moment, second moment, and model parameter as mtj , vtj and θtj . A
defense method is Adam-Byzantine resilient, if for the round T there exist positive constant numbers
Cm, Cv and Cθ, such that
1.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ ≤ Cm;
2.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥ ≤ Cv;
3.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ.
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Assumption 1. For any gradient g, its norm is upper bounded by a positive constant number gmax.
Formally, ‖g‖ ≤ gmax with g ∈ Gt ∪ G˜t, t ∈ N∗.
Assumption 2. After T ′ rounds of training, each component of vt−1 is lower bounded by a positive
constant number vmin. Formally, for any round t with t > T ′, vt−1k ≥ vmin, where vt−1k denotes the
k-th component of vt−1.
Lemma 1. Let k be any positive integer. if
k∑
i=1
ai ≤ A and
k∑
i=1
bi ≤ B with ai, bi, A,B ≥ 0. Then,
k∑
i=1
aibi ≤ AB.
Proof.
AB ≥
(
k∑
i=1
at
)(
k∑
i=1
bt
)
=
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
aibj
≥
k∑
i=1
aibi.
(9)
Thus,
k∑
i=1
aibi ≤ AB holds.
Lemma 2. If Assumption 1 holds, then for any client i with first moment mti at round t, the norm of
its first moment is upper bound by gmax. Formally,
∥∥mti∥∥ ≤ gmax.
Proof. We prove the lemma by mathematical induction.
When t = 1, since mt−1 =m0 = 0 and according to Assumption 1,∥∥m1i∥∥ = ∥∥β1m0 + (1− β1)g1i∥∥
=
∥∥(1− β1)g1i∥∥
≤ (1− β1)gmax
≤ gmax.
(10)
The first equality is due to the definition of first moment. The first inequality is due to Assumption 1.
Thus,
∥∥m1i∥∥ ≤ gmax holds.
Suppose when t = k,
∥∥mti∥∥ = ∥∥mki∥∥ ≤ gmax holds.
When t = k + 1, firstly, we focus on mk. Recall that the aggregation rule is weighted aggregation of
all clients in Fk. Formally,
mk =
∑
i∈Fk
λim
ki∑
i∈Fk
λi
, (11)
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where λi is the weight for the i-th first moment mki. When t = k,
∥∥mki∥∥ ≤ gmax holds. Thus,
∥∥mk∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈Fk
λim
ki∑
i∈Fk
λi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
∑
i∈Fk
λi
∥∥mki∥∥∑
i∈Fk
λi
≤
∑
i∈Fk
λigmax∑
i∈Fk
λi
= gmax.
(12)
The second equality is due to absolutely homogeneous of matrix norm. Now we draw our attention to
m(k+1)i: ∥∥∥m(k+1)i∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥β1mk + (1− β1)g(k+1)i∥∥∥
≤ β1
∥∥mk∥∥+ (1− β1)∥∥∥g(k+1)i∥∥∥
≤ β1gmax + (1− β1)gmax
= gmax.
(13)
The first inequality is due to triangle inequality and the second inequality is due to Eq. (12) and
Assumption 1. Thus, when t = k + 1,
∥∥mti∥∥ = ∥∥m(k+1)i∥∥ ≤ gmax holds.
Therefore, for any t ∈ N∗ , ∥∥mti∥∥ ≤ gmax holds.
Theorem 1. A-RFRS is Adam-Byzantine resilient, if Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, and for
any client i in Ft with gradient gˆti ∈ Gˆt, for any benign client j with gradient gtj ∈ Gt, and for
training round T ∈ N∗, there exist a positive constant number Cg , such that
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg.
Proof. Intuitively, since gˆti is not far from gtj , mˆti, vˆti and θˆ
ti
should also be close to mtj , vtj and
θtj . We will prove them step by step below.
The first step is to prove mˆti is close to mtj .
According to the definition of first moment,∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ = ∥∥β1mt−1 + (1− β1)gˆti − (β1mt−1 + (1− β1)gtj)∥∥
= (1− β1)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ . (14)
The second equality is due to absolutely homogeneous of matrix norm. By adding round 1 to round
T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ = T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(1− β1)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
= (1− β1)
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
≤ (1− β1)Cg.
(15)
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The first equlity is due to Eq. (14). The inequality is due to the assumption of Theorem 1. Let
Cm = (1− β1)Cg . Then Cm is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ ≤ Cm. (16)
Thus, condition 1 of Adam-Byzantine resilience holds.
The second step is to prove vˆti is close to vtj .∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥ = ∥∥β2vt−1 + (1− β2)gˆti  gˆti − (β2vt−1 + (1− β2)gtj  gtj)∥∥
= (1− β2)
∥∥gˆti  gˆti − gtj  gtj∥∥
= (1− β2)
∥∥(gˆti + gtj) (gˆti − gtj)∥∥
≤ (1− β2)
∥∥gˆti + gtj∥∥∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
= (1− β2)
∥∥(gˆti − gtj) + 2gtj∥∥∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
≤ (1− β2)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ (∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ 2 ∥∥gtj∥∥)
= (1− β2)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2 + 2(1− β2)∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥gtj∥∥ .
(17)
The first equality is due to the definition of second moment. The second equality is due to absolutely
homogeneous of matrix norm. The third equality follows from square of the difference formula. The
first inequality is due to submultiplicativity of matrix norm. The second inequality is due to triangle
inequality. By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(
(1− β2)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2 + 2(1− β2)∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥gtj∥∥)
≤(1− β2)
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2
+ 2(1− β2)
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ gmax
≤(1− β2)C2g + 2(1− β2)gmaxCg.
(18)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (17). The second inequality follows from Assumption 1. The third
inequality is due to the assumption of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. Let Cv = (1 − β2)C2g + 2(1 −
β2)gmaxCg . Then, Cv is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥ ≤ Cv. (19)
Therefore, condition 2 of Adam-Byzantine resilience holds.
The third step is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj . According to the definition, θˆ
ti
= θ
t−1 − mˆti√
vˆti
,
θtj = θ
t−1 − mtj√
vtj
(for simplicity, we omit the learning rate). We can decompose the proof into four
parts:
1.
√
vˆti is close to
√
vtj
2. 1√
vˆti
is close to 1√
vtj
3. mˆ
ti√
vˆti
is close to m
tj√
vtj
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4. θˆ
ti
is close to θtj .
The first part is to prove
√
vˆti is close to
√
vtj . We focus on one component of
√
vˆti and
√
vtj . For
any vector v, let vk denote the k-th component of v.∣∣∣∣√vˆtik −√vtjk ∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ vˆ
ti
k − vtjk√
vˆtik +
√
vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣vˆtik − vtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik +√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(20)
Recall that vˆtik = β2v
t−1
k + (1− β2)(gˆtik )2 and vtjk = β2vt−1k + (1− β2)(gtjk )2. When t > T ′,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik +√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√β2vt−1k + (1− β2)(gˆtik )2 +√β2vt−1k + (1− β2)(gtjk )2
≤ 1√
β2v
t−1
k +
√
β2v
t−1
k
≤ 1
2
√
β2vmin
.
(21)
The second inequality is due to Assumption 2. By combining Eq. (20) with Eq. (21),∣∣∣∣√vˆtik −√vtjk ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12√β2vmin
∣∣∣vˆtik − vtjk ∣∣∣ . (22)
We combine all the components together:∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥ ≤ 1
2
√
β2vmin
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥ . (23)
By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1
2
√
β2vmin
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥+ 1
2
√
β2vmin
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥vˆti − vtj∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥+ Cv
2
√
β2vmin
.
(24)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (23). The second inequality is due to Eq. (19). Let C ′v =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥+ Cv
2
√
β2vmin
. Then C ′v is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥ ≤ C ′v. (25)
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When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥ ≤ T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥
≤C ′v.
(26)
Thus Eq. (25) still holds.
The second part is to prove 1√
vˆti
is close to 1√
vtj
. Similar to
√
vˆti and
√
vtj , we also focus on one
components of 1√
vˆti
and 1√
vtj
.
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik − 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
vtjk −
√
vˆtik√
vˆtik
√
vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣√vˆtik −√vtjk ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(27)
Recall that
√
vˆtik =
√
β2v
t−1
k + (1− β2)(gˆtik )2 and
√
vtjk =
√
β2v
t−1
k + (1− β2)(gtjk )2. When
t > T ′,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√β2vt−1k + (1− β2)(gˆtik )2√β2vt−1k + (1− β2)(gtjk )2
≤ 1√
β2v
t−1
k
√
β2v
t−1
k
≤ 1√
β2vmin
√
β2vmin
=
1
β2vmin
.
(28)
The second inequality is due to Assumption 2. By combining Eq. (27) with Eq. (28),
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik − 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1β2vmin
∣∣∣∣√vˆtik −√vtjk ∣∣∣∣ . (29)
We combine all the components together:
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1β2vmin
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥ . (30)
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By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1
β2vmin
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ 1β2vmin
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√vˆti −√vtj∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ C ′vβ2vmin .
(31)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (30). The second inequality is due to Eq. (25). Let C ′′v =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥+ C′vβ2vmin . Then C ′′v is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ C ′′v . (32)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ T
′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ C ′′v .
(33)
Thus Eq. (32) still holds.
The third part is to prove mˆ
ti√
vˆti
is close to m
tj√
vtj
. We also focus on one component of mˆ
ti√
vˆti
and m
tj√
vtj
,
i.e., mˆ
ti
k√
vˆtik
and m
tj
k√
vtjk
. Let4mtk = mˆtik −mtjk and4vtk = 1√vˆtik −
1√
vtjk
.∣∣∣∣∣∣ mˆ
ti
k√
vˆtik
− m
tj
k√
vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣mˆtik 1√vˆtik −mtjk 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(mtjk +4mtk)( 1√vtjk +4v
t
k)−mtjk
1√
vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣mtjk 1√vtjk +m
tj
k 4vtk +
1√
vtjk
4mtk +4mtk4vtk −mtjk
1√
vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣mtjk 4vtk + 1√vtjk 4m
t
k +4mtk4vtk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣mtjk ∣∣∣ ∣∣4vtk∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣4mtk∣∣+ ∣∣4mtk∣∣ ∣∣4vtk∣∣ .
(34)
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When t > T ′,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√vtjk
=
1√
β2v
t−1
k + (1− β2)(gtjk )2
≤ 1√
β2v
t−1
k
≤ 1√
β2vmin
.
(35)
The second equality is due to the definition of 1√
vtjk
. The second inequality is due to Assumption 2.
By combining Eq. (34) with Eq. (35),
∣∣∣∣∣∣mˆtik 1√vˆtik −mtjk 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣mtjk ∣∣∣ ∣∣4vtk∣∣+ 1√β2vmin ∣∣4mtk∣∣+ ∣∣4mtk∣∣ ∣∣4vtk∣∣
=
∣∣∣mtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik − 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1√
β2vmin
∣∣∣mˆtik −mtjk ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣mˆtik −mtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√vˆtik − 1√vtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(36)
We combine all the components together:
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤∥∥mtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ 1√β2vmin ∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥+ ∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ . (37)
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By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(∥∥mtj∥∥ ∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
+
1√
β2vmin
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥+ ∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥)
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
β2vmin
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ .
(38)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (37). The second inequality follows from
Lemma 2. Since
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ ≤ Cm (Eq. (16)) and
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥ ≤ C ′′v (Eq. (32)), then
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ CmC ′′v . (39)
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The inequality follows from Lemma 1. We draw our attention back to Eq. (38):
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
β2vmin
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
vˆti
− 1√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
β2vmin
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥+ CmC ′′v
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥+ Cm√β2vmin + gmaxC ′′v + CmC ′′v
(40)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (38). The second inequality follows from Eq. (39). The third
inequality is due to Eq. (16) and Eq. (32). Let Cθ =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− mtj√
vtj
∥∥∥ +
Cm√
β2vmin
+ gmaxC
′′
v + CmC
′′
v . Then Cθ is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ. (41)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ T
′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cθ.
(42)
Thus Eq. (41) still holds.
The fourth part is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj . According to the definition of θˆ
ti
and θtj ,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ = T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥θt−1 − mˆti√
vˆti
− θt−1 + m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ mˆti√
vˆti
− m
tj
√
vtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cθ.
(43)
The inequality follows from Eq. (41). Therefore, condition 3 of Adam-Byzantine resilience holds.
Since condition 1,2 and 3 of Adam-Byzantine resilience all hold, A-RFRS is Adam-Byzantine
resilient.
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C FRS based on SGD with momentum
In this section, we propose the definition of SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilience and show
that our robust learning strategy is suitable in FRS based on SGD with momentum optimizer [30]
with theoretical guarantee.
The algorithm of SGD with momentum of client i at round t is:
mti = β3m
t−1 + gti
θti = θ
t−1 − ηmti
(44)
where gti, mti and θti are gradient, momentum and model parameter of client i at round t. η is the
learning rate. β3 is a hyperparameter controlling the weight of momentum. mt−1 and θ
t−1
represent
aggregated momentum and aggregated model parameter at round (t− 1).
Suppose n˜ out of n clients are Byzantine. Let Gt = {gti|i ∈ {1, ..., n− n˜}} be the gradient set of
n − n˜ benign clients at round t. Let G˜t = {g˜ti|i ∈ {1, ..., n˜}} be the gradient set of n˜ Byzantine
clients at round t. Let Ft be the set of selected clients for aggregation. Let Gˆt = {gˆti|client i ∈ Ft}
be the gradient set of clients in Ft. We define SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilience as follows:
Definition 2 SGD with momentum-Byzantine Resilience. For any client i in Ft, we denote its
momentum and model parameter as mˆti and θˆ
ti
. For any benign client j, we denote its momentum
and model parameter as mtj and θtj . A defense method is SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilient,
if for the round T there exists positive constant numbers Cm and Cθ, such that:
1.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ ≤ Cm ;
2.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ.
We propose SGD with momentum-based robust federated recommendation system (S-RFRS), which
utilize gradients to detect Byzantine clients in FRS based on SGD with momentum optimizer. The
algorithm of S-RFRS is the same to A-RFRS except the former uses SGD with momentum to learn
the model while the latter uses Adam to learn the model.
Theorem 2. S-RFRS is SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilient, if for any client i in Ft with
gradient gˆti ∈ Gˆt, for any benign client j with gradient gtj ∈ Gt, and for the round T , there exist a
positive constant number Cg , such that
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg.
Proof. Intuitively, since gˆti is not far from gtj , mˆti and θˆ
ti
should also be close to mtj and θtj . We
will prove them step by step below.
The first step is to prove mˆti is close to mtj .
According to the definition of momentum,∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ = ∥∥β3mt−1 + gˆti − (β3mt−1 + gtj)∥∥
=
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ . (45)
By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ = T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
=
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
≤ Cg.
(46)
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The first equlity is due to Eq. (45). The inequality is due to the assumption of Theorem 2. Let
Cm = Cg . Then Cm is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥ ≤ Cm. (47)
Thus, condition 1 of SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilience holds.
The second step is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj .
According to the definition of model parameter (for simplicity, we omit the learning rate),
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ = T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θt−1 − mˆti − θt−1 +mtj∥∥∥
=
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥mˆti −mtj∥∥
≤ Cm.
(48)
The inequality is due to Eq. (47). Let Cθ = Cm. Then Cθ is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ. (49)
Thus, condition 2 of SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilience holds.
Since condition 1 and 2 of SGD with momentum-Byzantine resilience all hold, S-RFRS is SGD with
momentum-Byzantine resilient.
D FRS based on AdaGrad
In this section, we propose the definition of AdaGrad-Byzantine resilience and show that our robust
learning strategy is suitable in FRS based on AdaGrad optimizer [12] with theoretical guarantee.
The algorithm of AdaGrad of client i at round t is:
rti = rt−1 + gti  gti
uti =
gti√
rti + 
θti = θ
t−1 − ηuti
(50)
where gti, rti, uti and θti are gradient, squared gradient, update, and model parameter of client i at
round t. η is the learning rate. rt−1 and θ
t−1
represent aggregated squared gradient and aggregated
model parameter at round (t− 1).  is a small constant for numerical stability.
Suppose n˜ out of n clients are Byzantine. Let Gt = {gti|i ∈ {1, ..., n− n˜}} be the gradient set of
n − n˜ benign clients at round t. Let G˜t = {g˜ti|i ∈ {1, ..., n˜}} be the gradient set of n˜ Byzantine
clients at round t. Let Ft be the set of selected clients for aggregation. Let Gˆt = {gˆti|client i ∈ Ft}
be the gradient set of clients in Ft. We define AdaGrad-Byzantine resilience as follows:
Definition 3 AdaGrad-Byzantine Resilience. For any client i in Ft, we denote its squared gradient
and model parameter as rˆti and θˆ
ti
. For any benign client j, we denote its squared gradient and
model parameter as rtj and θtj . A defense method is AdaGrad-Byzantine resilient, if for the round
T there exists positive constant numbers Cr and Cθ, such that:
1.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ ≤ Cr ;
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2.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ.
We propose AdaGrad-based robust federated recommendation system (AG-RFRS), which utilize
gradients to detect Byzantine clients. The algorithm of AG-RFRS is the same to A-RFRS except the
former uses AdaGrad to learn the model while the latter uses Adam to learn the model.
Assumption 3. For any gradient g, its norm is upper bounded by a positive constant number gmax.
Formally, ‖g‖ ≤ gmax with g ∈ Gt ∪ G˜t, t ∈ N∗.
Assumption 4. After T ′ rounds of training, each component of rt−1 is lower bounded by a positive
constant number rmin. Formally, for any round t with t > T ′, rt−1k ≥ rmin, where rt−1k denotes the
k-th component of rt−1.
Theorem 3. AG-RFRS is AdaGrad-Byzantine resilient, if Assumption 3 and Assumption 4 hold, and
for any client i in Ft with gradient gˆti ∈ Gˆt, for any benign client j with gradient gtj ∈ Gt, and for
the round T , there exist a positive constant number Cg , such that
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg.
Proof. Intuitively, since gˆti is not far from gtj , rˆti and θˆ
ti
should also be close to rtj and θtj . We
will prove them step by step below.
The first step is to prove rˆti is close to rtj .∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ = ∥∥rt−1 + gˆti  gˆti − (rt−1 + gtj  gtj)∥∥
=
∥∥gˆti  gˆti − gtj  gtj∥∥
=
∥∥(gˆti + gtj) (gˆti − gtj)∥∥
≤ ∥∥gˆti + gtj∥∥∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
=
∥∥(gˆti − gtj) + 2gtj∥∥ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
≤ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ (∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ 2 ∥∥gtj∥∥)
=
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2 + 2 ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥gtj∥∥ .
(51)
The first equality is due to the definition of squared gradient. The third equality follows from square
of the difference formula. The first inequality is due to submultiplicativity of matrix norm. The
second inequality is due to triangle inequality. By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all
benign clients together,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2 + 2 ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥gtj∥∥)
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2
+ 2
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ gmax
≤C2g + 2gmaxCg.
(52)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (51). The second inequality follows from Assumption 3. The third
inequality is due to the assumption of Theorem 3 and Lemma 1. Let Cr = C2g + 2gmaxCg. Then,
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Cr is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ ≤ Cr. (53)
Therefore, condition 1 of AdaGrad-Byzantine resilience holds.
The second step is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj . According to the definition, θˆ
ti
= θ
t−1 − gˆti√
rˆti
,
θtj = θ
t−1 − gtj√
rtj
(for simplicity, we omit the learning rate). We can decompose the proof into four
parts:
1.
√
rˆti is close to
√
rtj
2. 1√
rˆti
is close to 1√
rtj
3. gˆ
ti
√
rˆti
is close to g
tj
√
rtj
4. θˆ
ti
is close to θtj .
The first part is to prove
√
rˆti is close to
√
rtj . We focus on one component of
√
rˆti and
√
rtj . For
any vector r, let rk denote the k-th component of r.
∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ rˆ
ti
k − rtjk√
rˆtik +
√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣rˆtik − rtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik +√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(54)
Recall that rˆtik = r
t−1
k + (gˆ
ti
k )
2 and rtjk = r
t−1
k + (g
tj
k )
2. When t > T ′,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik +√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√rt−1k + (gˆtik )2 +√rt−1k + (gtjk )2
≤ 1√
rt−1k +
√
rt−1k
≤ 1
2
√
rmin
.
(55)
The second inequality is due to Assumption 4. By combining Eq. (54) with Eq. (55),∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12√rmin
∣∣∣rˆtik − rtjk ∣∣∣ . (56)
We combine all the components together:∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ ≤ 1
2
√
rmin
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ . (57)
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By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1
2
√
rmin
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ 1
2
√
rmin
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ Cr
2
√
rmin
.
(58)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (57). The second inequality is due to Eq. (53). Let C ′r =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ Cr2√rmin . Then C ′r is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ ≤ C ′r. (59)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ ≤ T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
≤C ′r.
(60)
Thus Eq. (59) still holds.
The second part is to prove 1√
rˆti
is close to 1√
rtj
. Similar to
√
rˆti and
√
rtj , we also focus on one
components of 1√
rˆti
and 1√
rtj
.∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
rtjk −
√
rˆtik√
rˆtik
√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(61)
Recall that
√
rˆtik =
√
rt−1k + (gˆ
ti
k )
2 and
√
rtjk =
√
rt−1k + (g
tj
k )
2. When t > T ′,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√rt−1k + (gˆtik )2√rt−1k + (gtjk )2
≤ 1√
rt−1k
√
rt−1k
≤ 1√
rmin
√
rmin
=
1
rmin
.
(62)
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The second inequality is due to Assumption 4. By combining Eq. (61) with Eq. (62),
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1rmin
∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣ . (63)
We combine all the components together:
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1rmin
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ . (64)
By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1
rmin
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ 1rmin
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ C ′rrmin .
(65)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (64). The second inequality is due to Eq. (59). Let C ′′r =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥+ C′rrmin . Then C ′′r is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ C ′′r . (66)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ T
′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ C ′′r .
(67)
Thus Eq. (66) still holds.
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The third part is to prove gˆ
ti
√
rˆti
is close to g
tj
√
rtj
. We also focus on one component of gˆ
ti
√
rˆti
and g
tj
√
rtj
,
i.e., gˆ
ti
k√
rˆtik
and g
tj
k√
rtjk
. Let4gtk = gˆtik − gtjk and4rtk = 1√rˆtik −
1√
rtjk
.∣∣∣∣∣∣ gˆ
ti
k√
rˆtik
− g
tj
k√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣gˆtik 1√rˆtik − gtjk 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(gtjk +4gtk)( 1√rtjk +4r
t
k)− gtjk
1√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣gtjk 1√rtjk + g
tj
k 4rtk +
1√
rtjk
4gtk +4gtk4rtk − gtjk
1√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣gtjk 4rtk + 1√rtjk 4g
t
k +4gtk4rtk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣gtjk ∣∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣4gtk∣∣+ ∣∣4gtk∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣ .
(68)
When t > T ′, ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√rtjk
=
1√
rt−1k + (g
tj
k )
2
≤ 1√
rt−1k
≤ 1√
rmin
.
(69)
The second equality is due to the definition of 1√
rtjk
. The second inequality is due to Assumption 4.
By combining Eq. (68) with Eq. (69),∣∣∣∣∣∣gˆtik 1√rˆtik − gtjk 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣gtjk ∣∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣+ 1√rmin ∣∣4gtk∣∣+ ∣∣4gtk∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣
=
∣∣∣gtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1√
rmin
∣∣∣gˆtik − gtjk ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣gˆtik − gtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(70)
We combine all the components together:∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤∥∥gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ 1√rmin ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ . (71)
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By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(∥∥gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
1√
rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥)
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ .
(72)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (71). The second inequality is due to Assumption
3. Since
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg (assumption of Theorem 3) and
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥ ≤ C ′′r (Eq. (66)), then
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ CgC ′′r . (73)
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The inequality follows from Lemma 1. We draw our attention back to Eq. (72):
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ CgC ′′r
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ Cg√rmin + gmaxC ′′r + CgC ′′r
(74)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (72). The second inequality follows from Eq. (73).
The third inequality is due to Eq. (66) and the assumption of Theorem 3. Let Cθ =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− gtj√
rtj
∥∥∥ + Cg√rmin + gmaxC ′′r + CgC ′′r . Then Cθ is a positive con-
stant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ. (75)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ T
′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cθ.
(76)
Thus Eq. (75) still holds.
The fourth part is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj . According to the definition of θˆ
ti
and θtj (for simplicity,
we omit the learning rate),
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ = T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥θt−1 − gˆti√
rˆti
− θt−1 + g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cθ.
(77)
The inequality follows from Eq. (75). Therefore, condition 2 of AdaGrad-Byzantine resilience holds.
Since condition 1 and condition 2 of AdaGrad-Byzantine resilience all hold, AG-RFRS is AdaGrad-
Byzantine resilient.
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E FRS based on RMSProp
In this section, we propose the definition of RMSProp-Byzantine resilience and show that our robust
learning strategy is suitable in FRS based on RMSProp optimizer [31] with theoretical guarantee.
The algorithm of RMSProp of client i at round t is:
rti = β4r
t−1 + (1− β4)gti  gti
uti =
gti√
rti + 
θti = θ
t−1 − ηuti
(78)
where gti, rti, uti and θti are gradient, squared gradient, update, and model parameter of client i at
round t. η is the learning rate. β4 is a hyperparameter controlling the weight of squared gradient. rt−1
and θ
t−1
represent aggregated squared gradient and aggregated model parameter at round (t− 1). 
is a small constant for numerical stability.
Suppose n˜ out of n clients are Byzantine. Let Gt = {gti|i ∈ {1, ..., n− n˜}} be the gradient set of
n − n˜ benign clients at round t. Let G˜t = {g˜ti|i ∈ {1, ..., n˜}} be the gradient set of n˜ Byzantine
clients at round t. Let Ft be the set of selected clients for aggregation. Let Gˆt = {gˆti|client i ∈ Ft}
be the gradient set of clients in Ft. We define RMSProp-Byzantine resilience as follows:
Definition 4 RMSProp-Byzantine Resilience. For any client i in Ft, we denote its squared gradient
and model parameter as rˆti and θˆ
ti
. For any benign client j, we denote its squared gradient and
model parameter as rtj and θtj . A defense method is RMSProp-Byzantine resilient, if for the round
T there exists positive constant numbers Cr and Cθ, such that:
1.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ ≤ Cr ;
2.
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ.
We propose RMSProp-based robust federated recommendation system (R-RFRS), which utilize
gradients to detect Byzantine clients. The algorithm of R-RFRS is the same to A-RFRS except the
former uses RMSProp to learn the model while the latter uses Adam to learn the model.
Assumption 5. For any gradient g, its norm is upper bounded by a positive constant number gmax.
Formally, ‖g‖ ≤ gmax with g ∈ Gt ∪ G˜t, t ∈ N∗.
Assumption 6. After T ′ rounds of training, each component of rt−1 is lower bounded by a positive
constant number rmin. Formally, for any round t with t > T ′, rt−1k ≥ rmin, where rt−1k denotes the
k-th component of rt−1.
Theorem 4. R-RFRS is RMSProp-Byzantine resilient, if Assumption 5 and Assumption 6 hold, and
for any client i in Ft with gradient gˆti ∈ Gˆt, for any benign client j with gradient gtj ∈ Gt, and for
the round T , there exist a positive constant number Cg , such that
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg.
Proof. Intuitively, since gˆti is not far from gtj , rˆti and θˆ
ti
should also be close to rtj and θtj . We
will prove them step by step below.
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The first step is to prove rˆti is close to rtj .∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ = ∥∥β4rt−1 + (1− β4)gˆti  gˆti − (β4rt−1 + (1− β4)gtj  gtj)∥∥
= (1− β4)
∥∥gˆti  gˆti − gtj  gtj∥∥
= (1− β4)
∥∥(gˆti + gtj) (gˆti − gtj)∥∥
≤ (1− β4)
∥∥gˆti + gtj∥∥∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
= (1− β4)
∥∥(gˆti − gtj) + 2gtj∥∥ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
≤ (1− β4)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ (∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ 2 ∥∥gtj∥∥)
= (1− β4)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2 + 2(1− β4)∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥gtj∥∥ .
(79)
The first equality is due to the definition of squared gradient. The second equality is due to absolutely
homogeneous of matrix norm. The third equality follows from square of the difference formula. The
first inequality is due to submultiplicativity of matrix norm. The second inequality is due to triangle
inequality. By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(
(1− β4)
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2 + 2(1− β4)∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥gtj∥∥)
≤(1− β4)
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥2
+ 2(1− β4)
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ gmax
≤(1− β4)C2g + 2(1− β4)gmaxCg.
(80)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (79). The second inequality follows from Assumption 5. The third
inequality is due to the assumption of Theorem 4 and Lemma 1. Let Cr = (1 − β4)C2g + 2(1 −
β4)gmaxCg . Then, Cr is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ ≤ Cr. (81)
Therefore, condition 1 of RMSProp-Byzantine resilience holds.
The second step is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj . According to the definition, θˆ
ti
= θ
t−1 − gˆti√
rˆti
,
θtj = θ
t−1 − gtj√
rtj
(for simplicity, we omit the learning rate). We can decompose the proof into four
parts:
1.
√
rˆti is close to
√
rtj
2. 1√
rˆti
is close to 1√
rtj
3. gˆ
ti
√
rˆti
is close to g
tj
√
rtj
4. θˆ
ti
is close to θtj .
33
The first part is to prove
√
rˆti is close to
√
rtj . We focus on one component of
√
rˆti and
√
rtj . For
any vector r, let rk denote the k-th component of r.∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ rˆ
ti
k − rtjk√
rˆtik +
√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣rˆtik − rtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik +√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(82)
Recall that rˆtik = β4r
t−1
k + (1− β4)(gˆtik )2 and rtjk = β4rt−1k + (1− β4)(gtjk )2. When t > T ′,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik +√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√β4rt−1k + (1− β4)(gˆtik )2 +√β4rt−1k + (1− β4)(gtjk )2
≤ 1√
β4r
t−1
k +
√
β4r
t−1
k
≤ 1
2
√
β4rmin
.
(83)
The second inequality is due to Assumption 6. By combining Eq. (82) with Eq. (83),∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12√β4rmin
∣∣∣rˆtik − rtjk ∣∣∣ . (84)
We combine all the components together:∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ ≤ 1
2
√
β4rmin
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥ . (85)
By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1
2
√
β4rmin
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ 1
2
√
β4rmin
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥rˆti − rtj∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ Cr
2
√
β4rmin
.
(86)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (85). The second inequality is due to Eq. (81). Let C ′r =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥+ Cr
2
√
β4rmin
. Then C ′r is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ ≤ C ′r. (87)
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When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ ≤ T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
≤C ′r.
(88)
Thus Eq. (87) still holds.
The second part is to prove 1√
rˆti
is close to 1√
rtj
. Similar to
√
rˆti and
√
rtj , we also focus on one
components of 1√
rˆti
and 1√
rtj
.
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
rtjk −
√
rˆtik√
rˆtik
√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(89)
Recall that
√
rˆtik =
√
β4r
t−1
k + (1− β4)(gˆtik )2 and
√
rtjk =
√
β4r
t−1
k + (1− β4)(gtjk )2. When
t > T ′,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√β4rt−1k + (1− β4)(gˆtik )2√β4rt−1k + (1− β4)(gtjk )2
≤ 1√
β4r
t−1
k
√
β4r
t−1
k
≤ 1√
β4rmin
√
β4rmin
=
1
β4rmin
.
(90)
The second inequality is due to Assumption 6. By combining Eq. (89) with Eq. (90),
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1β4rmin
∣∣∣∣√rˆtik −√rtjk ∣∣∣∣ . (91)
We combine all the components together:
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1β4rmin
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥ . (92)
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By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1
β4rmin
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ 1β4rmin
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥√rˆti −√rtj∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ C ′rβ4rmin .
(93)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (92). The second inequality is due to Eq. (87). Let C ′′r =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥+ C′rβ4rmin . Then C ′′r is a positive constant number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ C ′′r . (94)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ T
′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ C ′′r .
(95)
Thus Eq. (94) still holds.
The third part is to prove gˆ
ti
√
rˆti
is close to g
tj
√
rtj
. We also focus on one component of gˆ
ti
√
rˆti
and g
tj
√
rtj
,
i.e., gˆ
ti
k√
rˆtik
and g
tj
k√
rtjk
. Let4gtk = gˆtik − gtjk and4rtk = 1√rˆtik −
1√
rtjk
.∣∣∣∣∣∣ gˆ
ti
k√
rˆtik
− g
tj
k√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣gˆtik 1√rˆtik − gtjk 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(gtjk +4gtk)( 1√rtjk +4r
t
k)− gtjk
1√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣gtjk 1√rtjk + g
tj
k 4rtk +
1√
rtjk
4gtk +4gtk4rtk − gtjk
1√
rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣gtjk 4rtk + 1√rtjk 4g
t
k +4gtk4rtk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣gtjk ∣∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣4gtk∣∣+ ∣∣4gtk∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣ .
(96)
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When t > T ′, ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1√rtjk
=
1√
β4r
t−1
k + (1− β4)(gtjk )2
≤ 1√
β4r
t−1
k
≤ 1√
β4rmin
.
(97)
The second equality is due to the definition of 1√
rtjk
. The second inequality is due to Assumption 6.
By combining Eq. (96) with Eq. (97),∣∣∣∣∣∣gˆtik 1√rˆtik − gtjk 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣gtjk ∣∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣+ 1√β4rmin ∣∣4gtk∣∣+ ∣∣4gtk∣∣ ∣∣4rtk∣∣
=
∣∣∣gtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1√
β4rmin
∣∣∣gˆtik − gtjk ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣gˆtik − gtjk ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1√rˆtik − 1√rtjk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(98)
We combine all the components together:∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤∥∥gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ 1√β4rmin ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ . (99)
By adding round 1 to round T , all clients in Ft and all benign clients together, when T > T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
(∥∥gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
1√
β4rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ ∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥)
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
β4rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ .
(100)
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The first inequality is due to Eq. (99). The second inequality is due to Assumption
5. Since
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ≤ Cg (assumption of Theorem 4) and
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥ ≤ C ′′r (Eq. (94)), then
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ CgC ′′r . (101)
The inequality follows from Lemma 1. We draw our attention back to Eq. (100):
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
β4rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥ ∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
gmax
∥∥∥∥ 1√
rˆti
− 1√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
+
T∑
t=T ′+1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
1√
β4rmin
∥∥gˆti − gtj∥∥+ CgC ′′r
≤
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥+ Cg√β4rmin + gmaxC ′′r + CgC ′′r
(102)
The first inequality is due to Eq. (100). The second inequality follows from Eq. (101).
The third inequality is due to Eq. (94) and the assumption of Theorem 4. Let Cθ =
T ′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− gtj√
rtj
∥∥∥+ Cg√
β4rmin
+gmaxC
′′
r +CgC
′′
r . ThenCθ is a positive constant
number, and
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ Cθ. (103)
When T ≤ T ′,
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ T
′∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cθ.
(104)
Thus Eq. (103) still holds.
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The fourth part is to prove θˆ
ti
is close to θtj . According to the definition of θˆ
ti
and θtj (for simplicity,
we omit the learning rate),
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥θˆti − θtj∥∥∥ = T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥θt−1 − gˆti√
rˆti
− θt−1 + g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
=
T∑
t=1
∑
client i∈Ft
∑
benign client j
∥∥∥∥ gˆti√
rˆti
− g
tj
√
rtj
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cθ.
(105)
The inequality follows from Eq. (103). Therefore, condition 2 of RMSProp-Byzantine resilience
holds.
Since condition 1 and condition 2 of RMSProp-Byzantine resilience all hold, R-RFRS is RMSProp-
Byzantine resilient.
F Derivation of Byzantine gradient in camouflage attack
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Figure 5: The relation between the model parameter θti and the gradient gti of client i at round
t. Suppose point A is the benign point with benign θti and gti, point B is a Byzantine point with
the same θti but different g˜ti. point C has a unique mapping from θti from gti, and thus cannot be
camouflaged.
In this section, we demonstrate the derivation of Byzantine gradient in camouflage attack.
As shown in Figure 5, suppose point A is the benign point with benign θti and gti, the Byzantine
client can choose Byzantine point B which has the same θti but completely different g˜ti. According
to Adam update rule, the model parameter of point A and point B are computed by θti = θ
t−1 −
ηt β1m
t−1+(1−β1)gti√
β2vt−1+(1−β2)(gti)2
and θti = θ
t−1−ηt β1mt−1+(1−β1)g˜ti√
β2vt−1+(1−β2)(g˜ti)2
. Since they have the same update,
we can obtain
β1m
t−1 + (1− β1) gti√
β2v
t−1 + (1− β2) (gti)2
=
β1m
t−1 + (1− β1) g˜ti√
β2v
t−1 + (1− β2) (g˜ti)2
. (106)
By removing the fractions and square roots,(
β1m
t−1 + (1− β1) gti
)2 (
β2v
t−1 + (1− β2)
(
g˜ti
)2)
=
(
β1m
t−1 + (1− β1) g˜ti
)2 (
β2v
t−1 + (1− β2)
(
gti
)2)
.
(107)
By removing the parentheses,(
β21
(
mt−1
)2
+ 2β1 (1− β1)mt−1gti + (1− β1)2
(
gti
)2)(
β2v
t−1 + (1− β2)
(
g˜ti
)2)
=
(
β21
(
mt−1
)2
+ 2β1 (1− β1)mt−1g˜ti + (1− β1)2
(
g˜ti
)2)(
β2v
t−1 + (1− β2)
(
gti
)2)
.
(108)
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β21
(
mt−1
)2
β2v
t−1 + 2β1mt−1β2vt−1 (1− β1) gti
+ β2v
t−1 (1− β1)2
(
gti
)2
+ β21
(
mt−1
)2
(1− β2)
(
g˜ti
)2
+ 2β1m
t−1 (1− β1) gti (1− β2)
(
g˜ti
)2
+ (1− β1)2
(
gti
)2
(1− β2)
(
g˜ti
)2
=β21
(
mt−1
)2
β2v
t−1 + 2β1mt−1β2vt−1 (1− β1) g˜ti
+ β2v
t−1 (1− β1)2
(
g˜ti
)2
+ β21
(
mt−1
)2
(1− β2)
(
gti
)2
+ 2β1m
t−1 (1− β1) g˜ti (1− β2)
(
gti
)2
+ (1− β1)2
(
g˜ti
)2
(1− β2)
(
gti
)2
.
(109)
By deleting the same items,
2β1m
t−1β2vt−1 (1− β1)
(
gti − g˜ti)+ β2vt−1 (1− β1)2 ((gti)2 − (g˜ti)2)
− β21
(
mt−1
)2
(1− β2)
((
gti
)2 − (g˜ti)2)− 2β1mt−1 (1− β1) (1− β2) gtig˜ti (gti − g˜ti) = 0.
(110)
Since gti does not equal to g˜ti, we can divide the equation by (gti − g˜ti),
2β1m
t−1β2vt−1 (1− β1) + β2vt−1 (1− β1)2
(
gti + g˜ti
)
− β21
(
mt−1
)2
(1− β2)
(
gti + g˜ti
)− 2β1mt−1 (1− β1) (1− β2) gtig˜ti = 0. (111)
Thus, we can get
−
(
β2v
t−1 (1− β1)2 − β21
(
mt−1
)2
(1− β2)− 2β1mt−1 (1− β1) (1− β2) gti
)
g˜ti
= 2β1m
t−1β2vt−1 (1− β1) + β2vt−1 (1− β1)2 gti − β21
(
mt−1
)2
(1− β2) gti.
(112)
Then, we can obtain g˜ti:
g˜ti =
2β1β2 (1− β1)mt−1vt−1 + β2 (1− β1)2 vt−1gti − β21 (1− β2)
(
mt−1
)2
gti
β21 (1− β2)
(
mt−1
)2
+ 2β1 (1− β1) (1− β2)mt−1gti − β2 (1− β1)2 vt−1
. (113)
It is worth noting that not all θti can be camouflaged. For example, in Figure 5, point C has a unique
mapping from θti to gti. In this case, if we compute g˜ti by Eq. (113), the Byzantine update of model
parameter will equal to negative benign update of model parameter (i.e., β1m
t−1+(1−β1)gti√
β2vt−1+(1−β2)(gti)2
=
− β1mt−1+(1−β1)g˜ti√
β2vt−1+(1−β2)(g˜ti)2
). Thus, Eq. (107-113) hold but Eq. (106) does not hold.
G Datasets, baselines and configuration of experiments
In this section, we show the details of datasets, baselines and configuration of experiments.
We conduct our experiments on 4 real-world datasets: Last.fm [8], ML100K [15], Citeulike-a [33],
and Citeulike-t [34]. Last.fm contains music artist listening information from Last.fm online music
system with 1,892 users, 17,632 artists, and 92,834 listening records. ML100K, which was collected
through the MovieLens website, contains 100,000 movie ratings from 943 users on 1,682 movies.
Citeulike-a and Citeulike-t are collected in a real-world community of researchers and their citation.
Citeulike-a contains 5,551 users and 16,980 articles with 204,986 user-item pairs. Citeulike-t contains
7,947 users and 25,975 articles with 134,860 user-item pairs.
We compare A-RFRS with three baselines: Krum [7], RFA [24], and Trmean [41]. Krum precludes
the model parameters that are too far away and aggregates the remaining model parameters. RFA
replaces the weighted arithmetic mean aggregation with an approximate geometric median. Trmean
removes model parameters with large norms or small norms.
We set the dimension of pj ,qj (embedding vectors of item j) d = 64, learning rate η = 10−3, client
ratio e = 10−2, hyperparameter γ = 1, hyperparameter of Adam β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, and the
regularization coefficient λ = 10−4. All hyperparameter of baseline methods that are not mentioned
above are set to their default value. All experiments are run on the same machine with i7-5820K
CPU, 64GB RAM, and three GeForce GTX TITAN X GPU.
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H Additional experiments
In this section, we show the results of three additional experiments. Section H.1 shows Recall@K of
A-FRS and A-RFRS compared to baseline methods. Section H.2 demonstrates the impact of Adam
optimizer in learning an FRS. Section H.3 shows that our learning strategy is also effective on FRS
using other optimizers (SGD with momentum [30] and AdaGrad [12]).
H.1 Recall@K of A-FRS and A-RFRS
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Figure 6: Recall@K of FRSs on 4 datasets. A-FRS (red line) is our proposed federated recommenda-
tion method.
41
1 2 3 4 5
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
R
ec
al
l@
K
Last.fm, 20% Byzantine clients
 
 
No defense
Trmean
RFA
Krum
A−RFRS
1 2 3 4 5
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
Last.fm, 30% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
Last.fm, 40% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
R
ec
al
l@
K
ML100K, 20% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
ML100K, 30% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.12
ML100K, 40% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
R
ec
al
l@
K
Citeulike−a, 20% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Citeulike−a, 30% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Citeulike−a, 40% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
K
R
ec
al
l@
K
Citeulike−t, 20% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
K
Citeulike−t, 30% Byzantine clients
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
K
Citeulike−t, 40% Byzantine clients
 
 
Figure 7: Recall@K (mean and standard deviation) of all methods on 4 datasets and 3 different
numbers of Byzantine clients. A-RFRS (red line) is our proposed defense method.
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H.2 Impact of Adam optimizer
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Figure 8: Precision@K of FRS based on Adam and SGD.
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H.3 Performance of defense methods on FRS based on other optimizers
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Figure 9: Precision@K of all defense methods in FRS based on SGD with momentum. S-RFRS (red
line) is our proposed method.
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Figure 10: Precision@K of all defense methods in FRS based on AdaGrad. AG-RFRS (red line) is
our proposed method.
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